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THE NUREMBURG TRIAL REVISITED
CARL HAENSEL
ITLER having committed suicide, the four great powers decided
in the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, to punish the
major criminals, the men next to Hitler, by International
Military Tribunal. Thus, it was not a world tribunal appointed by the
United Nations which condemned the apocalyptic attempt to subject
human beings to a diabolic mind.
CRIMES BEFORE 1939 NOT CONSIDERED
The indictments were limited to crimes which were supposed to
have been committed after the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia
in 1938, and after the beginning of the war against Poland, on Sep-
tember 1, 1939. Consequently, all the Nazi-crimes which were com-
mitted after the "seizure of power" in 1933 were neglected. The
judgment of the International Military Tribunal emphasizes: "The
first acts of aggression referred to in the indictment are the seizure
of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the first war of aggression charged
in the indictment is the war against Poland, beginning on September
1, 1939."1
"It was contended for the prosecution that certain aspects of the
anti-semite policy were connected with the plans for aggressive war." 2
The first real fact considered in the judgment was: "the violent
measures taken against the Jews in November, 1938," in retaliation
for the killing of an official of the German embassy in Paris.
The racial ideology was nothing more than a political instrument
for Hitler, nothing else. He said to Rauschnigg: "Such a thing as
race does not exist in a scientific sense .... I, as a politician, need a
concept which is suitable to dissolve an order which hitherto was
built upon historical continuity and to enforce a completely new
1 Official Transcript of the Int. Mil. Trib., August 31, 1946, p. 16920. Hereinafter cited
as Transcript.
2 Transcript, p. 16919.
Chief Counsel for the SS (Die Schutz-Staffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei) and the SD (Der Sicherheitsdienst) before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg; Professor of Law in the University of Tuibingen; Author of
Das Gericht vertagt sich ("The Tribunal Will Adjourn").
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anti-historical order and to support it ideologically. ' 3 In the chapter,
"The Consolidation of Power," the Tribunal stated in the last sen-
tence of the judgment that:
Through the effective control of the radio and the press, the German people,
during the years which followed 1933 were subjected to the most intensive propa-
ganda in furtherance of the regime. Hostile criticism, indeed criticism of any
kind was forbidden, and the severest penalties were imposed on those who in-
dulged in it. Independent judgment, based on freedom of thought, was rendered
quite impossible.4
A clear distinction was also made between the Nazi party and the
German people as a whole, and between the members of the Nazi
party who were the officers and the men responsible for having taken
a consenting part in the crimes committed during the war and the
Germans who were the victims of the Nazi brutalities and Hitlerite
domination.5 But the crimes of the Nazis against the German people
were not considered by the International Military Tribunal (I.M.T.).
THE EUTHANASIA PROGRAM
Hitler ordered the Reichsleiter Buhler and Dr. Brandt to accord
to incurable persons a "mercy death, after a most careful diagnosis
of their condition of sickness." This activity was called the euthana-
sia program. Any relation between these measures and the measures
taken for the final solution of the Jewish problem was neither estab-
lished nor even hinted at by the I.M.T. There was no distinction
between Germans and Jews. Every German mental institution re-
ceived questionnaires from the Interior of the Reich, which were to
be completed for each inmate of the institution. Germans, Jews and
other nationals were all subjected to euthanasia. About 100,000 people
were killed as a result of this program in Germany and Austria alone.
The whole program was kept absolutely secret; Hitler's letter of
September 1, 1939, ordering the euthanasia and marked "top secret,"
was never published. The German Minister of Justice did not receive
a copy of it until one year after its issue. Without any doubt, eu-
thanasia was murder according to the German law.6 However, the
letter of Hitler was not a law.
3 Speeches with Hitler, original edition: London, 1939. German translation: Zurich,
1940.
4 Transcript, p. 16813.
5 Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, printed in Trials of War Criminals.
See note 1.
6 Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1949, vol. I, p. 806.
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In the opinion of the I.M.T., however, the word euthanasia is not
used at all. It merely mentions the measures taken for the purpose of
killing all persons who were in special institutions because of old age,
mental illness, or disease. This included German nationals and foreign
workers in the separate judgment of defendant Frick, Reichmaster of
the Interior. Later, euthanasia was treated by the American Military
Tribunal in the medical case in 1947. Another function of the eu-
thanasia program was the killing of mentally and bodily deficient
children. The German public was horrified by euthanasia and the
manner of its execution. The wildest scenes imaginable are reported to
have taken place, and some of these people did not board the bus
voluntarily and were forced to do so by the accompanying personnel.7
These measures could not be excused as tasks to insure the "political
security" or to punish rebels. The mercy death-Gnadentod-was
accorded to such a large number of feeble and insane persons, that
it was impossible to perform "A most careful diagnosis of their con-
ditions of sickness." The I.M.T. had a great opportunity to dem-
onstrate that the trials punished the inhumanity against Germans as
well as the atrocities against foreigners. However, it did not take any
advantage of the opportunity, and that was one of the reasons for the
unpopularity of the I.M.T. judgment.
On August 31, 1946, when the judgment of the I.M.T. was read
at Nuremberg, the word "euthanasia" was used. But the Court of
Assizes in Berlin, at the session of March 25, 1946, found the defend-
ants Hilde Wernicke and Helene Weiczorek guilty of murder and
sentenced them to death. The court of appeals in this case rejected
the appeals of both defendants. The following quotation from the
findings is of interest: "It cannot be mistaken that the defendants
Wernicke and Weiczorek are only the last links of a chain, and that
they are preceded by persons whose guilt is greater."
Professor Werner Heyde was the top expert of the euthanasia pro-
gram. He disappeared in 1945 and lived as Dr. Fritz Sawade in Flens-
burg. In 1959 he was discovered and unmasked. A monumental trial
against him and three leaders of the euthanasia program, Friedrich
Tillmann, Dr. Gerhard Bohne, and Dr. Hans Hevelmann, was pre-
pared. Before it started, on February 14, 1964, in Limburg, Heyde
and Tillmann committed suicide; Bohne escaped to South America,
and only Dr. Hevelmann, the least important of the four, appeared
7 Applice Report, quoted vol. 11, c.p. 802.
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before the assizes in Limburg. There was a great rebellion among the
German population, and the German prosecution was reproached
for having failed to take suitable precautions, which proves that the
German people never forgot the crimes against insane and incurable
persons.
Referring to this failure of German justice, newspapers as well as
wireless and television commentators pointed out the necessity of
judging and punishing according to German law these abominable
crimes, and denounced everyone who had helped the guilty individ-
uals to commit suicide or escape so as to avoid punishment.
THE JUDGMENT APPLIED INTERNATIONAL, NOT GERMAN,
LAW TO GERMAN INDIVIDUALS
The crimes which were the subject of the trial took place during
the war between 1939 and 1945, and those, the crimes of German
nationals, were examined according to international law. Three of
the twenty-four defendants were acquitted by the I.M.T.'s order of
October 1, 1946, although many Nazi documents submitted by the
prosecution and published in the German press gave these defendants'
names. The German people did not understand the I.M.T.'s order to
release the acquitted defendants, and the Bavarian police guarded the
exits of the Nuremberg Court to restrain the excited men who de-
manded that the acquitted defendants be judged and punished by
German courts.8
The Moscow Declaration, released on November 1, 1943, provided
that members of the Nazi party who had been responsible for the
activities or who had taken a consenting part therein be sent back
to the countries in which their abominable deeds occurred so as to
be judged and punished according to the law of those countries. The
declaration also provided that major criminals, whose offenses had no
particular geographical locale, would be punished by the joint de-
cision of the governments of the Allies.
There would have been no difficulty in finding the twenty-four
defendants in the I.M.T. guilty according to German law, had it
been administered by the I.M.T. The German criminal law provided
at that time for capital punishment, by means other than hanging;9
8 Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, War Crimes and International Law, Carnegie
Endowment, New York. German Edition: Ziirich 1950.
9 Penal Law of May 15, 1871, with alteration laws and Military Penal Law of June 20,
1872, as fixed on October 10, 1940.
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this provision was subsequently abolished.' 0 No difficulty was en-
countered in interpreting the Nazi laws enacted subsequent to Jan-
uary 30, 1933; these laws were deprived of effect by Law No. 1 of
the Military Government after its proclamation on August 30, 1945.
But, German legal and moral thinking is dominated by the principle
of equal treatment, and the German prosecution has to prosecute
every crime, for it is regarded as a failure and weakness not to punish
every crime committed. In 1955, the Minister of Justice alarmed the
public by stating that many more crimes were committed than pros-
ecuted; many violations are not reported and remain unknown to the
police. Only one out of ten parents report a sexual attack, so as to
avoid their children's being shocked by the proceedings. The German
Administration of Justice is convinced that the so-called "dunkel-
ziffer" ("dunkel" means remaining secret) is a danger for German
society." For this reason the main objection against the I.M.T. trial
was that the war criminals who were members of the victorious
powers were not prosecuted.
THE CONSPIRACY
Much discussed were the objections against the Nuremberg "in-
dictment": that the acts violating the law of nations can only be
done by the state.' 2 I will neither discuss nor deny the opinion that
guilty individuals should not escape by relying on this age old excuse,
as Wyzinski does," but I agree with him as to his emphasis of the
principle: nullum crimen et nulla poena sine lege. Justice Robert
Jackson, Chief of Council, submitted at the beginning of the trial, as
exhibit number one, four documents of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and
he asked the Tribunal for the interpretation and application of this
pact and for the adoption of the "system of collective security."
There was, however, no penal law involved here. The Charter of the
Internal Military Tribunal was a penal law, signed on August 8, 1945,
by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
10 Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland of May 23, 1949, art. 102.
11 Universitas, Stuttgart, April, 1963, p. 379.
12 Smith, President, American Bar Association: The Nuremberg Trials, Am. Bar
Assoc. Journal, Chicago, July, 1946, p. 394.
1a Wyzinski: "Nuremberg-A Fair Trial?" The Atlantic, Boston, April, 1946.
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of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On August 8, 1945, all
defendants were imprisoned, but all the crimes were committed be-
fore the unconditional surrender of May, 1945. There is no criminal
code which is merely restricted to setting forth the constituent ele-
ments of maintenance of peace, as in the diplomatic pacts, according
to the Kellogg and Briand suggestions. On the contrary, every na-
tional penal code contains a great number of regulations which
determine the general and special conditions which make an act pun-
ishable, conditions which are fundamentally common to all crimes,
be this in the form of a definite decree, of common law brought
into a system by decision of trial courts, or of publications of mem-
bers of the legal profession. To the theory of individual responsibility
the prosecution stated: "If these men be immune, then law has lost its
meaning and men must live in fear." But, if men are involved in and
believe in the murdering of Jews or of prisoners of war, the quotation
from a paragraph of international law is not needed to punish them
by a military tribunal during war, administering national law. But
Count Two of the indictment charged the defendants with commit-
ting specific crimes against peace by planning, preparing, initiating,
and waging wars of aggression against a number of other states. In
the judgment of the I.M.T. (treated in the chapter "The Law as to
the Common Plan or Conspiracy") the planning and preparation of
a war of aggression by the defendants is a crime under international
law. Only four of the twenty-four defendants were found guilty of
having "conspired" in preparing an aggressive war.
The indictment asked that the Tribunal declare the following or-
ganizations to be criminal: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party,
the Gestapo, The S.D., the S.S., the S.A., the Reich Cabinet, and
the General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces. The
judgment stated: "A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal
conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal
purposes. There must be a group bound together and organized for
a common purpose."'14 But only three of the six organizations were
declared to be criminal: the Gestapo, the S.D., and the S.S. The
Tribunal believed that no declaration of criminality should be made
with respect to the S.A., Reich Cabinet, or General Staff and High
Command of the Armed Forces. The chapter closes with the follow-
ing words: "Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought
14 Transcript, p. 16930.
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to trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes
should not escape punishment." Guilty of individual crimes, not of
conspiracy!
General Nikitschenko protested on the first of October, 1946, by
a dissenting opinion, to the release of three defendants and also stated
that the three acquitted organizations were criminal. Nikitschenko was
the justice nominated by Stalin as a member of the I.M.T. for the
U.S.S.R. Nikitschenko also protested because Rudolf Hess, the rep-
resentative of Hitler, was not condemned to death. Hess is to this
very day a prisoner of the Four Allied Powers at Spandau.
Subsequent to the International Military Tribunal, the United
States held a series of twelve trial proceedings at Nuremberg. The
Control Council Law No. 10, promulgated December 20, 1945, was
the legal basis for these proceedings. The defendants in these pro-
ceedings, charged with war crimes and other offenses against inter-
national penal law, were prominent figures in Hitler's Germany, and
included such outstanding diplomats and politicians as: two State-
Secretaries of the Foreign Office; Cabinet Ministers; Field Marshalls;
S.S. Leaders; and leading professional men including attorneys and
physicians. In the I.M.T. case against the major criminals, the indict-
ment of conspiracy was not without effect because the sentence
would have been the same whether or not conspiracy was found. In
the subsequent Military Trials, however, it could have been decisive,
as, for example, in the case of the State Secretary of the Foreign
Office (my client), who could be implicated in war crimes by con-
spiracy, though he neither shot nor gave an order to shoot, but was
a member of the Hitler Government. For this reason, on June 30,
1947, I presented a trial brief addressed to the Military Tribunals I,
II, and III at Nuremberg, alleging that the indictment was legally
insufficient because the crime of conspiracy is known neither to the
international law nor continental law. I was encouraged by the state-
ment of Francis B. Sayre that "it is utterly unknown to the Roman
law; it is not found in modern continental codes; few continental
lawyers ever heard of it. It is a doctrine which has proved itself the
evil genius of our law wherever it has touched it."1" The three acting
Military Tribunals had only one general session during the trials. The
15 35 HARV. L. REv. 397-Carl Haensel: "Das Organisationsverbrechen," Munich, 1947.
Carl Haensel: "Die Zyklische Wiederkehr des Nauurrechts," Schweizer Zeitschrift fir
Strafrecht, 1950, number 3.
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United Tribunal, administering only international law,'6 decided
after my pleading that the conspiracy was not a matter of the in-
dictment.
It was a great moment. The German people as a whole were fi-
nally acquitted of criminal conspiracy for planning, preparing, ini-
tiating and waging a war of aggression, including murder and ill
treatment of civilian population of occupied territory, not justified
by military necessity. If the indictment had been completely success-
ful in all counts and against all the individual defendants, and all the
six organizations had been declared criminal, a doctrine so vague in
its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as criminal con-
spiracy would have led to a great number of criminal proceedings
against individual Germans. Perhaps even individuals who were Nazi
victims themselves might have been involved. But now the circle of
war criminals was confined; now there was established for the future
a uniform rule for the prosecution of similar offenders.
SUPERIOR ORDER AND EMERGENCY
The majority of the 199 men accused before the I.M.T. and the
American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg during 1945 to 1949
admitted that they committed the acts with which they were charged,
following superior orders in presumed self-defense or under con-
ditions of presumed emergency. The Military Tribunals developed
the theory: It would not be in conformity with the principles of
material justice if principles alien to the German and European con-
cept of law were applied in considering the legality of various forms
of conduct, such as acting in emergency or presumed emergency,
acting in self-defense or in presumed self-defense. During the years
following the last military judgment, rendered on April 14, 1949, a
great number of proceedings were held by German courts administer-
ing German law, and based on the documents of the Nuremberg
Trials.
THE DOCUMENTS
The first surprise in Nuremberg in October, 1945, was the enor-
mous quantity and quality of documents which were introduced in
evidence by the prosecution. When the United States Army entered
16 Telford Taylor, "Nuremberg Trials," New York, 1950, German Edition: Zurich
1950, p. 127.
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German territory, it had specialized military personnel whose duties
were to capture and preserve German documents, records and ar-
chives. Such documents were assembled in temporary document
headquarters. Later each army established fixed document centers in
the United States zone of occupation where their documents were
assembled and the slow process of indexing and cataloging was be-
gun. 7 The documents of the Staff Main Office (S.S. Center) alone
filled six large railway cars. These documents showed that the exter-
mination program on racial and political grounds also extended to
prisoners of war. Many of these cruel documents were deposited in
armored safes. The question arose: Why have these mortal proofs
not been destroyed? No answer. It was the desire of the defense to
have access to the document center, but it was not granted. The
documents introduced in evidence by the prosecution were presented
in document books. Only an index of the seized documents of the
Staff Main Office was submitted. These documents constitute a
source of historical material, covering all the events in the fateful
years preceding 1933, up to 1945, in Germany and elsewhere in
Europe. The bulk of these documents were presented for historical
purposes, as only a few of them would have been sufficient for sen-
tencing purposes. The hunting for documents resulted in the most
complete documentation ever compiled of the history of a single
period.
THE JUDGE APPOINTED BY STALIN
The I.M.T. consisted of four members, each with an alternate.
One member and one alternate was appointed by each of the sig-
natories: the United States; the French Republic; the United King-
dor; and the Stalinist Government. The Stalinist member of the
Tribunal was the Major General of Justice, I. T. Nikitschenko.
In the chapter "The Aggression Against Poland," the judgment
of the I.M.T. established that Hitler held an important military con-
ference on May 23, 1939, at which he announced his decision to
attack Poland. The judgment continues:
During the weeks which followed the conference other meetings were held
and directives were issued in preparation for the war. The defendant Ribbentrop
was sent to Moscow to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.' 8
17 Trials of War Criminals, 1.c., vol. 1, p. 75.
18 Official Transcript, p. 16841.
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On March 25, 1946, Alfred Seidel, defense counsel for defendant
Hess, introduced as an exhibit the treaty between Germany and the
government appointed by Stalin, dated August 23, 1939, for non-
aggression and a secret complement fixing a Demarkationslinie
dividing Poland. The Germany State Secretary and Ambassador of
the Foreign Office, Dr. Friedrich Gaus, analyzed the importance of
these pacts permitting Hitler to carry out the planned aggression
against Poland on September 1, 1939. The exhibits were not admitted
into evidence by the Tribunal because they were not the originals.
General Rudenkow, chief of the prosecution staff of the Stalin Gov-
ernment, protested against the admission of these exhibits stating that
he had no knowledge of a secret treaty. The motion to hear Stalin
as a witness was overruled. The documents in Dr. Seidel's possession
were only copies; the signed originals were in the hands of the Stalin
Government. The German original had been captured in Berlin in
1945. At first, on October 14, 1946, two weeks after the reading of
the judgment at Nuremberg, the State Secretary of the British Foreign
Office officially revealed in the British House of Commons that the
secret pacts of 1939 between Stalin and Hitler had been discovered
in Germany. 9
On April 9, 1940, the German forces invaded Norway and Den-
mark. The Tribunal unanimously denied the contention that this
invasion was "an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense."
The German Ambassador in Moscow had announced to Molotov,
the same day, April 9th, that the invasion of Norway and Denmark
would start, and Molotov answered: "I wish Germany a good and
plentiful success with its defense measures. ' 20 Robert W. Cooper
reported: 2 1 The Russian prosecution did not follow the other Allies
who charged Goering and Keitel with having murdered 11,000 Pol-
ish officers in the Katyn Forest during the war. The defendant re-
plied that the Bolshevists had committed this slaughter. In the course
of four days the witnesses produced by both sides were heard, and
the end results were injurious to the Soviets. Cooper concludes cau-
tiously: in this matter the last word has not yet been heard. The
Tribunal gained the impression that the defendants were not con-
19 "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowiet Union 1939 bis 1941,
Dokumente des Auswartigen Amtes."
20 Seidel, L.C., p. 174.
21 The Nuremberg Trial, German edition: Kerfeld, 1947, p. 44.
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vinced of this accusation. Everybody hearing Dr. Gaus and reading
the documents submitted by Dr. Seidel at Nuremberg was even then
convinced-now everybody knows it-that there existed a political
conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin with the aim of taking posses-
sion of parts of Poland; but a political conspiracy is not the equivalent
of a criminal conspiracy at Common Law. The President of the
Tribunal, His Excellency Lord Justice Lawrence, had great difficulties
in avoiding incidents while the sessions were going on, but he mas-
tered every situation. On March 25, 1946, the defense counsel, Dr.
Seidel, submitted the copy of the secret treaty, the original of which
was signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov, Stalin's plenipotentiary. The
charter of the I.M.T. defined as a crime against peace the participation
in a common plan of international treaties, signed August 8, 1945,
by General R. Rudenko for the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
CONCLUSION
The proceedings, the treatment of the defendants and the rights
granted to the defense counsel were very fair; however, the legal
foundation of the proceedings could be attacked. Suspicion could
arise insofar as the proceedings could be looked upon as a retaliation
of the victors, because the Tribunal consisted of neither a represent-
ative of the defeated Germany nor a repersentative of a neutral nation.
It took half a generation to mature the problem of international
penal law and to understand that the peace of the world cannot be
promoted by trial and punishment under the device: Vae victis! But
the five years of Nuremberg had another positive result: Men who
began the trial as adversaries became and remained friends for later
common work. For the first time, lawyers did not discuss the different
penal laws of different countries; on the contrary, they discussed
the theoretical aspects of penal law based on the conclusions reached
at the congresses and meetings of the past. Now for the first time in
the history of the science of comparative penal law, American and
English judges demonstrated and practiced their own rules in a pro-
ceeding in a continental country. They judged continental defend-
ants according to their own rules. We observed that the Anglo-Saxon
penal law for proceedings and for the hearings of witnesses is ex-
tremely exact, although complicated and expensive.
Hans Frank, at the beginning of Hitler's reign and in the preceding
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time, acted as Hitler's personal counsel in legal matters. He was later
appointed Governor of Poland where he employed a large staff of
historians to assemble his famous diary, produced as an exhibit by
the prosecution. He exclaimed in his last words, written in 1946, that:
We have fought against Jewry: we have fought against it for years: and we
have allowed ourselves to make utterances-and my own diary has become a
witness against me in this connection-utterances which are terrible.... A thou-
sand years will pass and this guilt of Germany will still not be erased. 22
By emphasizing this he did not intend to save his life, nor did he do
so. It was a confession of his moral guilt, a guilt beyond international
law.
The German people failed ethically, according to the highest moral
standards, by passivity, because the situation urged resistance, even
at the price of life. This lack of activity however is not punishable
by worldly judges, by representatives of other nations and by Stalin
-who also are not infallible-administering an international criminal
law not theretofore existing. But now, in their role as victors, they
received the German people's confession of guilt, which was not to
be taken advantage of in outlawing the offenders, but was to be used
to construct a new international unit, administering a better inter-
national law.
22 Transcript, p. 16918.
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